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SUSANNE WIBORG
The aim of this article is to investigate why Sweden, the epitome of social democracy,
has implemented education reforms leading to an extraordinary growth in Free Schools
in contrast to liberal England, where Free School policy has been met with enormous
resistance. Conventional wisdom would predict the contrary, but as a matter of fact
Sweden has bypassed England by far in outsourcing schools to private providers. The
comparative argument promulgated in this article is that the combination of three in-
terconnected variables—(1) type of political system, (2) party policy changes along the
Left-Right dimension, and (3) the responses of the Left toward market-led reforms of
education—are key in explaining this difference in Sweden and England.
Introduction
Sweden, the epitome of social democracy, has implemented education re-
forms leading to an extraordinary growth in Free Schools in contrast to
liberal England, where Free School policy has been met with enormous re-
sistance. Conventional wisdom would predict the opposite, but Sweden has
bypassed England by far in outsourcing schools to private providers. This
policy variance merits an investigation whereby factors that account for
this contribute to the development of a comparative theory of Free School
policy. The hypothesis is that Sweden has experienced a remarkable cross-
party consensus on Free School policy in contrast to England, which has wit-
nessed notable partisan differences over the issue. In Sweden, this consensus
emerged as a result of the Social Democrats endorsing market-oriented pol-
icies on education.1 This is an unexpected act, which will be scrutinized to
understand why Free Schools (Friskolar) became an ensconced part of the
Swedish education system. In the case of England, I argue that no such con-
sensus ever existed between Labour and the Conservatives. In the educa-
tion policy literature it is commonly held that the Coalition governments’
(2010–) introduction of the Academies Act 2010 (which included Swedish-
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1 In this article the term “marketization” is used to refer to the use of market mechanisms in the
delivery of educational services. The term covers mainly contracting out, for example, Free Schools to
private providers, and the use of voucher schemes.
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style Free Schools) was merely to expand the scope of the previous Tony
Blair government’s City Academy program. This may be considered as a
cross-party consensus; however, I demonstrate that this view is a misinter-
pretation of education policy and establish the contrary, namely, that the
parties have pursued conﬂicting objectives for education reform. The crux
of the matter is then why the Swedish Social Democratic party accepted
privatization of education, while Labour has largely chosen to reject such a
course of action in reforming English education. In Sweden, not only were
private providers of schools allowed to enter the “education market” but
were permitted to be proﬁt making. In stark contrast, private providers op-
erating in England are denied proﬁt making within the public school sector.
This contrast becomes all the more perplexing when the traditional under-
standing about the left-wing parties in the two countries is taken into ac-
count. Labour, in its New Labour manifestation under Tony Blair, has made
notable moves to the Right, while the Swedish Social Democratic party is the
archetypical bastion of left-wing hegemony. While it may be expected of right-
wing parties to embark on an out-sourcing strategy for education, it is un-
clear why a left-wing party would even consider in engaging in such an act.
The case-oriented method (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 33; Mahoney
and Rueshemeyer 2003, 101; Landman 2008, 70) will be applied to Sweden
and England in an effort to uncover key features behind the variance of
Free School policy. This method seeks to explain where a particular out-
come varies across similar countries by identifying variables that account
for this. While controlling for those features common to the countries, the
outcome of interest is the presence of a Free School program in two cases,
Sweden and England; the independent variables behind its variance are:
(1) type of political system, (2) party policy changes along the Left-Right di-
mension, and (3) the responses of the Left toward market-led reforms of
education. The variables have been identiﬁed through examination of pre-
vious explanations of privatization of education that failed to explain the
cross-country variation. The inclusion of two cases only has limited capacity
in building a generalized explanation, but the variables put forward in this
article can serve as a basis for future applications on further sets of cases
to advance the explanatory power of the Free School theory. The article is
divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part describes the Free Schools in Sweden
and England. This is followed by an analysis of previous explanation of the-
ories of education privatization. Part two will proceed to analyze the inde-
pendent variables informed by theories accumulated in political party sys-
tems, welfare state regimes, and education policy literature.
What Is a Free School?
In seeking to privatize education, both England and Sweden intro-
duced similar types of state-funded but privately run Free Schools. The Free
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Schools operate outside local government control, are funded directly by
government, and run, for example, by charities, groups of parents, religious
organizations, and, in the case of Sweden, businesses for proﬁt. The schools
are granted a high level of independence, perhaps more so in the case of
England where they for example are free from the national curriculum. In
Sweden, Free Schools have since 2009 been made subject to same regulative
framework as municipality schools and are bound by various ordinances
and curricula requirements. The Free Schools in England operate their
own admissions authorities, whereas in Sweden places are strictly allocated
on a “ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served” basis. In both countries the Free School ini-
tiative represents the most overtly market-oriented policy as it explicitly pro-
motes nonstate actors to set up schools while the state is “rolled back” to
mainly grant subsidies and inspect schools (Erixon Arreman and Holm
2011; Hatcher 2011; Vhaclos 2011).
In Sweden, in 1991, a quasi-voucher scheme was introduced so that Free
Schools became entitled to 85 percent, later raised to 100 percent, of the
per-student spending in state schools for each child they taught. A sharp
growth in Free Schools resulted, not because of great interest among com-
munity groups in setting up new schools, but for-proﬁt providers who were
allowed into the “school market.” In 2011, 20 percent of compulsory school
children attend Free Schools in Sweden (at upper secondary level), and
10 percent attend Free Schools (at primary/lower secondary level). Over
65 percent of all of these schools are for-proﬁt, which translates into 13 per-
cent all Swedish schools (Sahlgreen 2011). The not-for-proﬁt Free Schools,
usually offering special pedagogy or religious education, is a niche within
the private school sector and extremely slow growing.
In England, Free Schools were introduced later (in 2010) by the Coa-
lition government (2010–15). Since then about 174 Free Schools have been
established (Department of Education 2013) with schools in the pipeline
waiting for approval by the Department of Education. The Free Schools
present a small number in the education sector. This may be because it is
still relatively recently that this school type has been implemented; however,
it is very unlikely they will expand at a Swedish rate if for-proﬁt providers are
banned from setting up and running schools in the country. It is this very
issue that has sparked an intense and polarized debate in England inhib-
iting a Swedish-like consensus.
Previous Attempts at Explaining Market-Led Reforms of Education
There is a growing research interest in Free Schools, but the education
policy literature offers mainly country-speciﬁc accounts of their develop-
ment.2 These are rarely analyzed relatively if comparison is understood as
2 See Wiborg 2010; Erixon Arreman and Holm 2011; Hatcher 2011; Vlachos 2011; Higham 2013.
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the process of eliminating rival explanations in building generalized theo-
ries valid across countries (Landman 2008, 4). Free Schools are commonly
treated as part of the market-oriented reform agenda and explained ac-
cording to theories that, I argue below, face difﬁculties in accounting for
cross-country variation.
One inﬂuential explanation of marketization of education is the “global
economy” thesis, which argues that the shift in policy toward neoliberalism
is a result of the increasingly global orientation of the world economy (Dale
and Robertson 2002; Anderson-Levitt 2003; Verger 2012). In the words
of Olsen (1996, 351) the transition from a “capitalist world economy” to
a “world capitalist economy” involves the transformation of multinational
corporations into transnational corporations deﬁned as those who have
expanded their international production at the expense of their domestic
market. International foreign exchange, capitalist markets and newly cre-
ated or modiﬁed supranational agreements—as well as organizations such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European
Union (EU), and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—play an increas-
ingly central role in liberalizing world trade. These global institutions have
facilitated the erosion of the power of national states. Consequently, Keynes-
ianism, social planning, and the welfare state have often yielded to mon-
etarist policies, even under social democratic governments. This change
was propelled by the macroeconomic problems that the OECD countries
experienced in the 1970s and privatization of public services, including ed-
ucation, was pursued to make cuts to the welfare state.
One hypothesis that arose from this thesis is that countries that faced
the gravest macroeconomic difﬁculties embarked on market-oriented re-
forms to the greatest extent. This would predict that England, which has ex-
perienced greater ﬁnancial problems during the post-war period than Swe-
den, would out-source schools to private providers to a further extent. This is
not the case; ﬁnancial crises certainly put strong pressure on governments,
and their response to them could include their willingness to implement pri-
vatizing reforms. However, the economy thesis fails because it cannot ade-
quately justify why these reforms were regarded as viable in better economic
times as witnessed in the 1990s. If economic constraints were the key factor
propelling education reforms, more extensive reforms would be implemented
during periods of unfavorable economic condition than in more prosperous
times. This is obviously not the case since reforms aiming at privatizing edu-
cation were implemented during the 1990s both in Sweden and England
when economic conditions were comparable to those of the thriving days
of the 1960s (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Although the economy thesis has
obvious inconsistencies, it should not be rejected outright but rather tested
further both empirically and comparatively.
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The political thesis, which has acquired a prominent position in educa-
tion policy literature, seeks to explain market-led reforms of education by
focusing on what drives politicians to reform in the ﬁrst place. Politics is fun-
damentally about the exercise of public authority and the struggle to gain
control over it—not least in times of institutional reform (Moe 1990, 221).
The political thesis is usually associated with the “global policy” or “neolib-
eral” agenda of the 1980s, and on this basis, it is argued that market-led
reforms of education have been implemented to a larger degree in coun-
tries with long-serving, right-wing governments. Following this line of argu-
ment, one would expect that England, with long-serving Conservative gov-
ernments, would go much further in privatizing education than in Sweden,
which has had many fewer years of center-Right governments. This did not
happen. The Danish case offers an even better example why the argument
fails. In spite of two long-serving right-wing governments (1982–1993, 2001–
2011), a total of 19 years, privatization of social services, including the edu-
cation sector, hardly occurred inDenmark.Green-Pedersen (1999, 256; 2002,
272) asserts that when the Social Democrats returned to power in 1993,
after being in opposition for 10 years, the Danish welfare state was in better
shape than in 1982; it had been further developed (i.e., by expanding uni-
versal, ﬂat rate, and tax-ﬁnanced beneﬁts), its economic foundations were
much improved, and public support remained unabated.3
If the political thesis were valid in explaining cross-country variation,
England would have gone further than Sweden and Denmark even further.
There is no positive correlation between the duration of right-wing gov-
ernments and the extent of contracting out and use of market mechanisms
in reforming education across the European states. Another problem with
this argument is that the role of the Left in enacting such reforms is usually
neglected or, at best, described as merely continuing right-wing govern-
ments’ policies unable or unwilling to break away from it. In the case of
Sweden, as we will see later, this argument ignores the fact that many of the
most important changes in market-regulating education were initiated, or
accelerated, by the Social Democrats in 1990 and 1991, just before they lost
power; this happened on a scale that, in England, Tony Blair and his gov-
ernment never even attempted to reach.
A third argument behind market-led education concerns the role played
by the middle classes. Although there has been very little research, there is
a growing view among education scholars that the middle classes in the pur-
3 The same holds true for Germany. In 1982, a coalition government there consisting of the
Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party launched a neoliberal program along similar lines to those in
the United Kingdom and United States. However, their market-oriented public sector reforms had no
real policy impact, and interestingly, creating a more market-regulated and demand-oriented education
system had even less (Klitgaard 2007a, 2007b).
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suit of advance education and opportunities for their children promote pri-
vatization of education. In a rare comparative study about state sanctioning
of alternative education provision in Sweden, England, and France, John-
ston and van Wijnbergen (2010) argue that the middle class, an essential
constituency for the Right and Left parties, is most likely to beneﬁt from
consumer choice, having both the voice to demand and the information to
obtain quality but not the means to go fully private. However, in relation to
the Free Schools, the middle class’s support appears to be relatively low and
highly divided. This particular issue has not yet been researched, but recent
polls give some support to this claim. In the 2010 Ipsos Mori Poll, 44 percent
of parents considered schools run by private companies, religious groups,
charities, or groups of parents a bad idea, compared to 24 percent who
supported them. Sixty-two percent thought that the local authorities were
best placed to run schools (NASUWT/Unison 2010). A survey a year later by
the National Union of Teachers (2011) revealed that parental support for
Free Schools was low, just 25 percent, and that the support was much higher
among private school parents than state school parents (National Union of
Teachers 2011). In Sweden, an increasing number of middle class parents
make use of school choice, but recent polls (Vlachos 2011) showed that they
remain highly skeptical about the proﬁt motive of the Free School providers
(Wiborg 2009, 2010). The middle class argument has some capacity to ex-
plain the push toward privatization of education, but comparatively viewed
it is inconclusive.
Explanations stressing macroeconomic constraints, right-wing politics,
and the role of the middle classes indeed contribute to understanding what
drives market-led education reforms, but they cannot sufﬁciently explain
cross-country variance. Analysts of these theories tend to assume global forces
act in the same way in shaping policy in all countries, thus neglecting lo-
cal political histories when examining educational policy. It still remains a
question why Free Schools, as part of this privatizing agenda, could ﬂourish
in Social Democratic Sweden, whereas they struggle to manifest themselves
in liberal England.
Sweden: Consensus Politics
In the case of Sweden, it is frequently argued in the education literature
that the Conservative-led coalition government that came to power in 1991
is to be squarely blamed for initiating privatization of education.4 As the
country’s ﬁrst neoliberal government, it deliberately set out to radically trans-
form the Swedish welfare state. In addition to the welfare cuts, credit mar-
ket, and tax reforms, it deregulated, privatized, and introduced a variety of
4 See Richardson 1999; Lundahl 2002, 2005; Bunar 2008, 2010.
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other measures to encourage competition and “restore” the market.5 Many
of these changes were hastened by the prospect of membership in the Eu-
ropean Union, which encouraged such developments. In education, a ma-
jor reform was passed in 1992, which allowed privately run schools to offer
primary and secondary education and to receive public funding for each
student at a level similar to that of state schools.
While it is correct that this right-wing government took a big step toward
outsourcing schools to private providers, the argument ignores the fact that
many of the most important changes were in fact initiated or brought to
fruition by the Social Democrats before they lost power in 1991. For exam-
ple, in 1990 they enacted a quasi-voucher model that allowed parents to
choose between state schools and hundreds of new state-ﬁnanced Free
Schools.6 The voucher scheme ensured that the Free Schools could compete
against state schools for students on an almost equal ﬁnancial basis. Why
would they do this? Even in comparison to neighboring Denmark, Sweden—
in building a universal welfare state—often stood out in the discouragement
of, and even hostility to, private providers, especially within the health and
education sectors. By the 1960s, most of the pre-existing private providers
were phased out largely through funding cuts. For instance, less than 1
percent of school children in the 1960s until early 1990s attended a private
school. While such private alternatives can be considered desirable for a
nation that had not previously experienced much choice in the welfare sys-
tem, they tend to increase differential access, two-tier provision, and social
inequality. The question here is why Social Democratic governments would
risk such consequences. Since the Social Democrats held power uninter-
ruptedly for about 50 years during the middle of the twentieth century,
resulting in a weak and fractious right-wing bloc, analyzing their behavior
concerning the privatization of education should yield great insights into the
entire question of such reform.
The Political System and Consensus Culture
The consensus culture in Sweden, affecting all political processes and
promoting accord between the Social Democrats and sections of the Right,
is an essential factor in the comparative theory of Free School policy. Swe-
den’s multiparty system has since the early interwar period fostered a tra-
dition of consensus building across political blocs. By the turn of the twen-
5 For example, telecommunication and broadcasting monopolies, the national telephone com-
pany, postal services, and state alcohol authority and retail company have been subject to deregulation,
while municipal cleaning services and parts of the public transportation system have been contracted
out.
6 It also included creation of private alternatives in health care, and the provision of public
funding for private day care.
FREE SCHOOL POLICY IN SWEDEN AND ENGLAND
Comparative Education Review 479
tieth century the Swedish electoral system, which mirrored an international
pattern, changed from majority to proportional representation, allowing for
the representation of numerous parties in Parliament. This multiparty sys-
tem, in which minority government was and still is commonplace, facilitates
a process of cross-party bargaining and negotiation even with the opposi-
tion. In addition, interest organizations—particularly the teacher unions—
have been involved or consulted in the policy-making process. By sharing
power with the opposition and interest organizations and so including them
in the rule of the country, governments seek to achieve consensus-based
majority. Thus, there is a “hidden” majority within the Swedish minority
governments. To quote a Swedish expression, it is an unwritten tradition
that the aim of governments, even small ones, is to “anchor” their politics
within a broad agreement constituting the majority. Even during the 1970s
and 1980s, where a two-bloc system with shifting governments emerged,
many agreements were reached across this bloc cleavage. During the fol-
lowing decades and up to the present, cooperation and consensus between
parties dominates, although there has been a slight erosion of this tradition
since the early 1990s.7 The multiparty system with its typical minority gov-
ernments, which has fostered a consensus-building tradition, goes some
distance in explaining why the Left and Right without much disagreement
could agree on the Free Schools policy. However, it does not really address
why the Left “acted Right” in reforming Swedish education in the ﬁrst place,
only that consensus agreement for the above-mentioned reasons was likely
to be reached.
The Social Democrats on the Left-Right Dimension
Why did the Left act Right? To answer this question, it is beneﬁcial to
scrutinize the positioning of the Social Democrats on the Left-Right dimen-
sion. The most comprehensive data on policy preferences are from the Com-
parative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; see also Lowe et al. 2011),
which gathers the results of coding of more than 3,000 election manifestos
for more than 650 parties in about 50 countries since 1945. In political sci-
ence research, the CMP is primarily used to locate policy positions for po-
litical parties on Left-Right scales and parties’ distances to each other. Budge
et al. (2001, 39) show that the Swedish Social Democrats during the 1960s
and 1970s made a Left turn in politics as a consequence of being dependent
on support from the Communist Left. The two parties had been leapfrogging
in the earlier post-war years, but with the diminishing Communist power in
the 1970s, the Social Democrats started to move to the Right, particularly
after the emergence of the Greens in the 1990s. This brought them closer to
the smaller “bourgeoisie” parties, the Liberals and the Centre Party, but they
7 See Einhorn and Logue 1986, 207; Blom-Hansen 2000; Arter 2008, 156; Sejersted 2011.
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are still clearly distinguished from the conservatives, who are marked by a
generally stronger rightist stance than their Danish and Norwegian coun-
terparts, a feature that can be traced all the way back to the mid-nineteenth
century. The Social Democrats’ support draws from the Centre Party, the
Liberals (who were and still are strongly involved in education policy), and
the Christian Democrats. Each of these parties is more centrist than the larg-
est right-wing party, the Moderates, and during most of the 1990s, they were
indistinguishable from the Social Democrats on the CMP’s Left-Right dimen-
sion. This trend has persisted to the present. As the Swedish Social Demo-
crats since the 1990s have developed policy preferences closer to those of the
Right also aids in understanding how this unprecedented consensus could
be reached. However, what brought them to give up their original socialist
stance in the ﬁrst place and make a move toward the Right and, for the in-
terest of this study, what consequences this has had for Free School policy,
still needs further analysis.
Social Democratic Response to Free School Policy
According to the power resource theory (PRT), which focuses on the
role of social democracy in the development of welfare regimes,8 the So-
cial Democrats’ effort to protect the welfare state they (mainly) created and
muster electoral support, upon which the maintenance of that state de-
pends, compelled them to make a strategic move to the Right. Welfare
states in which the Social Democratic labor movement has been success-
ful in building its power resources, notably the Scandinavian countries,
are remarkable for their development of a universal welfare state. The So-
cial Democrats thus rely heavily on the maintenance of the welfare state to
muster political support and win elections. Gösta Esping-Andersen (1985),
a leading scholar within the PRT tradition, argues that not only was the
provision of universal welfare programs a political agenda of the Social
Democrats; it was also an explicit political instrument that brought them to
power. The Social Democrats aimed at designing the welfare provision to be
of such quality and comprehensive availability that private providers would
recede. In education policy, this implied developing a highly egalitarian
school system while restricting access to private schools. The crucial point is
that most citizens at some point in their lives have been beneﬁciaries of
welfare and as such are strongly inclined to support it and thus the Social
8 The power resource theory (PRT) was borne out of welfare state research, particularly advanced
by Scandinavian scholars (Korpi 1980, 1983, 1989; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990) whose comparative
investigation of the relationship between social policy and labour mobilisation enabled them to dis-
tinguish between the evolution and outcomes of welfare states across industrialized states. The PRT
approach is employed in analyzing a broad range of welfare sectors such as health care, pension, and
housing. Education, except for childcare, has been subject to much less attention, but recently a few
studies have sought to include this sector too in the study of welfare state types (Iversen and Stephens
2008; Busemeyer 2009).
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Democrats in the national elections. Therefore, it is important for the Social
Democrats to utilize the “welfare state” as means of mustering political sup-
port.9
In as much as the Social Democrats have a reason to believe a particular
policy issue is a threat to welfare state legitimacy, they may be prepared to
implement market-type reforms if these are considered to prevent loss of
legitimacy and declining welfare state support. The strategy of the Social
Democrats is thus to take the risk of effecting market-oriented reforms in
order to protect the universal welfare state, which is their most valuable
institutional weapon. Since they depend on the welfare institutions to re-
alize their political ambitions, they are prepared to allow market forces even
if they produce greater social stratiﬁcation.
The Social Democrats have encountered a threat to “their” welfare
state from the increasingly powerful center-right wing parties. By the mid-
1980s, the Conservatives were joined by two centrist parties, the Peoples’s
party and the Centre party, in promoting privatization and consumer choice,
creating for the ﬁrst time in the post-war period a bulwark against Social
Democratic welfare policies. When the Social Democrats assumed power in
1985, they were compelled to respond this threat and hence initiated a de-
centralization process whereby some social services were transferred to mu-
nicipalities as well as offering citizens the possibility of choosing between
public beneﬁts on the one hand and private but publicly ﬁnanced beneﬁts
on the other. The Social Democrats anticipated that this concession would
preempt the right wing from making further demands for privatization re-
forms. The Social Democratic party was not united in this stance, but the
views of the factious pro-market wing in the party, which revolved around the
Minister of Finance, Kjell-Oluf Feldt, came to represent the ofﬁcial party line
(Green-Pedersen 2002; Klitgaard 2007b).
The Social Democrats, during their period in government from 1986 to
1991, decentralized the education system by transferring the administration
of Swedish schools to the municipalities, while the central state involvement
was restricted to decision making concerning general aims for education
and providing general funding and inspection.10 The decentralization pro-
cess in Sweden was probably the most turbulent period for education in the
post-war period as it triggered an array of reforms, changing completely the
governance of education. Sweden thus went from a highly centralized sys-
tem in which municipalities and schools had very limited inﬂuence over
education to one of the most decentralized systems in Europe in a relatively
short period of time (Arnesen and Lundahl 2006).
9 See Esping-Andersen 1985; Green-Pedersen 2002; Anderson 2006; Klitgaard 2007b.
10 The previous Conservative government, 1976–82, had opened the way for this by transferring
state subsidies to the municipalities.
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In addition to the decentralization reform, in 1990–91 the Social Dem-
ocrats (as mentioned earlier) introduced parental choice in conjunction
with a voucher system. Social Democrats had anticipated that school choice
would be restricted to the public sector only, but since the new funding
scheme (introduced by the previous government) allowed Free Schools to
receive public funding on equal terms with state schools, school choice
was inevitably extended to the private sector as well. The Social Democrats,
who had strongly opposed public funding of private schools during the
1980s, collided with the Conservatives and Liberals over the issue. In a par-
liamentary committee, in which the government bill proposing the new
funding scheme was debated, the Centre party, who was the main political
ally of the government, suggested that municipalities should allocate re-
sources to all schools irrespective of whether these were public or private.
However, the Social Democratic government had in actual fact already
endorsed this viewpoint by allowing parents to choose between state schools
and public-funded private schools (Richardson 1999; Arnesen and Lundahl
2006; Klitgaard 2007b).
The Conservative-led coalition government under Carl Bildt’s leader-
ship from 1991 to 1994 heralded a further shift toward marketization of
education. The government replaced the funding scheme, means-tested
grants to schools, with a new scheme, which gave Free Schools the right to
receive a sum per pupil of 85 percent of the average cost of a pupil in state
schools. This change in funding policy, which enabled these schools to
compete with state schools on an almost equal ﬁnancial basis, resulted in a
sharp growth in Free Schools, from 60 in 1991 to 709 in 2009–10. The
paucity of interested parental and community groups in setting up schools,
since they preferred to leave it to the state, made it easy for private business
to expand their interests (Erixon Arreman and Holm 2011).
Between 1994 and 2006, the Social Democrats returned to power and
continued to support the Free Schools. Since they had already embraced
Free School policy, it no longer appeared credible to revert to a position
similar to that of pre-1980s. Regardless of internal disagreements, the party
nevertheless accepted the legitimacy of private providers of social and ed-
ucational services. In the government bill from 1995 it is stated: “Indepen-
dent schools have for a long time had a place within the Swedish education
system. They constitute a part of the entire education provision. Indepen-
dent schools [Free Schools] are different and contribute to the diversity of
the education system. Diversity in itself is positive and it is not in contra-
diction to either equality or good quality. On the contrary, diversity is, as a
rule, a prerequisite of development and educational innovation” (Bill 1995/
96: 200, 37; my translation).
The Social Democrats abolished previous Conservative-led government
(1991 and 1994) policy that approximately 15 percent of Free Schools’ op-
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erational costs should be covered by user fees. They argued that the ﬁnan-
cial situation of parents should not determine the educational opportuni-
ties of their children. Instead Free Schools should be fully state funded so
that attendance would be free of charge. Free Schools were thus gener-
ously state funded and built on the principle of equal conditions with the
state schools. Subsequently, legislation has been put in place that requires
Free Schools to comply with the same requirements as those regulating the
state schools. The cross-party consensus about the Free Schools remains
unabated to the present day, despite the fact that the Social Democrats have
suffered unprecedented losses in the last three successive elections.
England: Partisan Politics of Education
It is commonly held by education researchers that the British political
parties’ stance on education reveals such small differences that it is difﬁcult
to tell the parties apart. For example, Clyde Chitty and John Danford assert
that “it is possible to argue that New Labour has accepted much of the
Conservative Government’s education agenda . . . on a broad front, the
Conservative education program has remained remarkably intact” (1999,
150). Anne West and Hazel Pennell (2002, 218) conclude in their analysis
of New Labour’s education policy choices that “the Labour Government can
be seen to have embraced the quasi-market with enthusiasm similar to that
of its Conservative predecessors. The main structures of the quasi-market are
still in place—choice, open enrolment, funding following pupils, school
diversity, and publication of league tables.” Diane Reay (2008, 639) reached
similar conclusion by stating that “beneath the rhetoric, Blair’s legacy has
been one of consolidating and reinforcing [sic] previous Conservative pol-
icies.” Moving on to the Coalition government, it is frequently asserted that
the Academy program is merely a continuation of the New Labour’s pro-
gram (Avis 2011; Hatcher 2011; Ball 2013).
This emphasis on the similarity between parties’ education policies is
exacerbated in research using the Network approach (Brans 1997; De
Bruijn and Ringeling 1997; Kickert and Klijn 2000). This approach, which
originated in political science and public administration, has grown in pop-
ularity within education policy research in England.11 Although it has its
obvious advantages—for example, the mapping of relationships between
different actors in policy processes—some of its inherent problems are
transferred into education research, most notably its inevitable stress on
consensus. The theoretical basis of the network approach is that actors are
seen as mutually dependent, so policy can only be realized on the basis of
cooperation. Policy outcomes are then regarded as a result of collaboration
11 See Ball 2008, 2009; Ball and Exley 2010; Braun et al. 2010; Exley et al. 2011.
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and interaction strategies of various actors. If these are unsuccessful, they are
explained due to failure of interactions between actors caused by, for ex-
ample, lack of power resources, disagreements, or institutional structures.
Only when actors are able to bring their perceptions together and formulate
common interests will the policy games lead to satisfactory outcomes. In the
words of Klijn and Koppenjan (2000, 143) “the emergence of concerted
action is explained through the acknowledgement of mutual dependencies,
converging perceptions, and the existence of incentives that foster cooper-
ation.” Hence strong focus is put on mediating, coordinating, and consen-
sus, consequently ignoring or underestimating conﬂict power and power
differences.12
It may not be a surprise that this approach to policy analysis was origi-
nally developed on the basis of countries with coalition governments, a strong
consensual political culture, and decentralized state system. Thus, it remains
a question if it can be applied successfully to unitary states with majority
systems without overemphasizing consensus in policy making. The electoral
system in Britain, with its single member constituencies and plurality win-
ners, has facilitated the creation of parliamentary majorities and single-party
governments (with very few exceptions); as a result, according to the political
scientist Ian Budge (2008, 53), policy has become more ideological and less
aggregative. Even under the Coalition (2010–15), which should have pro-
duced a more consensual form of government, education policy remained
highly partisan. The weight the network theorists put on collaboration and
agreement in education policy in their UK-focused research underestimates
the rather different objectives for education that the political parties are pur-
suing; the very lack of consensus about Free Schools policy, which was even-
tually found in Sweden, conﬁrm this.
Majority Governments and Conﬂictual Politics
The lack of consensus building capacity in British politics can to a far
extent be explained by the political system itself. Since 1945, the United
Kingdom has been, broadly speaking, a two-party majoritarian democracy
with a centralized and unitary state, in which political parties are not ex-
pected to share ofﬁce, unlike in multiparty consensus democracies such as
Sweden, where they do. Until 1970 the United Kingdom had a two-party
system, but subsequently the number of “minor” parties has increased, most
notably the Liberal Democrats and their predecessors. Britain has what
Blondel describes a “two-and-a-half-party system” (Blondel in Webb 2000).
The Liberal Democrats is a smaller but still signiﬁcant party, since, in Gio-
vanni Satori’s words, it has “coalition” and “blackmail” potential (1976, 122–
23).
12 For example, network approach is criticized of considering government merely as an “actor
among other actors” when describing multilayers of networks.
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The increased number of political parties, resulting in “moderate plu-
ralism,” has fostered more interaction and cooperation between the parties,
but there is no doubt that this is still far more prevalent in the consensus
democracy of Sweden. Moreover, the party system in the United Kingdom,
even in its moderated form, entails alternation of power between compet-
ing parties. Since the large parties are capable of governing on their own
and not obliged to share power with rival parties, two-party systems are al-
most bound to result in competitive behavior. According to Webb (2000, 7),
alternation of power is indeed one of the main aspects of competitive be-
havior found in two-party systems. Whereas power is shared in a majori-
tarian democracy between the parties consecutively, that is, one party at a
time, Webb (2000, 8) succinctly states that it is shared concurrently in a
consensus democracy. In striking contrast to Sweden, the British political
system is not conducive toward consensus-building policy making, which
goes some distance in explaining why education policy remains more conﬂict-
ridden than in Sweden. This also depends on the positioning of the politi-
cal parties on the Left-Right dimension to which I will now turn, focusing
particularly on the Labour party movements on this dimension and contrast-
ing it to its Swedish counterpart.
The Positioning of the Labour Party on the Left-Right Dimension
As demonstrated by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Bara and Budge
2001; Budge et al. 2001), historically the Labour party, in comparison to the
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, has ﬂuctuated on the Left-Right di-
mensionmore extensively. Initially (in 1945) the Labour partymoved sharply
away from the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which was followed by
movement by the Conservatives toward the Labour party in the 1950s (the
Age of Consensus). Subsequently, the Labour party moved toward Conser-
vative positions although to a much lesser degree in the 1960s. Labour
headed leftward again in the 1970s up to 1983, then rightward in 1987, and
leftward in 1992.
From 1992 to 1997 Labour moved sharply to the Right; according to
Bara and Budge (2001, 594), for the ﬁrst time in post-war history, in 1997
Labour revealed a predominance of right-wing political positions over left-
wing ones. Meanwhile, the Conservatives moved fairly consistently right-
ward from 1959 onward. They remained quite steady throughout the 1980s,
because of the strong appearance of the New Right. In other words, they
remained relatively far from Labour in the rightward direction. From 1964
the Liberals took up a center position between the two major parties, al-
though much closer to Labour from 1974 onward (Bara and Budge 2001;
Budge et al. 2001).
Examining Labour further in more recent times, Tony Blair, by moving
to the Right, has been commonly credited with “seizing” the center-ground
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in his party’s pursuit of “Middle England” in the run-up to the election of
1997. A major reason behind the rightward orientation of Labour (and the
Liberal Democrats), Bara and Budge (2001) argue, was the issue of efﬁcient
delivery of public services, which interestingly also was what prompted the
Swedish Social Democrats to move toward the Right. On the basis of com-
prehensive textual analysis of Labour manifestos, they demonstrate that the
right turn by Labour is in fact much exaggerated. Although in relative terms
Labour became the centrist party, it far from whole-heartedly endorsed a
Thatcherite stance; in fact, a deep cleavage ran between the two parties.
When Labour consolidated its centrist stance and retrieved its electoral
position, producing a landslide election in 1997, it then moved back toward
its ideological home on the left.
This was evidenced in particular by Gordon Brown’s imposition of a levy
on recently privatized industries and, in 1998, a marked increase of allo-
cations for social spending. After 2001, Labour then moved further Left but
only slightly as they still occupied the right-wing side of the measure scale.
The long-standing divide between Labour and the Conservatives primarily
concerns welfare, and this is due to Labour’s traditional and continuing
support of it. The biggest difference the parties show regarding the relative
importance of policy issues (out of 16 policy areas compared) is, interestingly,
in the domain of education, where Labour favors expansion of schooling to
a much greater degree than the Conservatives would ever endorse (Bara and
Budge 2001, 595; 2008; Fielding 2003).
Given the entire history of the developments described above, we can
tentatively conclude that Labour policy preferences are still clearly separate
from the Conservatives, particularly in relation to education, regardless of
the fact that the Labour party moved toward rightist positions starting in
the mid-1990s until about 1997 before it retreated to the left. How does the
ideological positioning of Labour compare to that of its Swedish counter-
part? Timothy Hicks (2011) shows that in the period between 1997 and
2006, during which both parties were in power in their respective countries,
the Swedish Social Democrats were, perhaps as expected, to the Left of
Labour, but—crucial to point out here—after 2006 and up to the present,
they were far Right of Labour (ﬁg. 1). This further Right position may ex-
plain the variation in Free School expansion between Sweden and England.
I will now turn to the English education situation before making compar-
ative inferences.
Labour’s Response to Academies and Free Schools
This section will make two points: ﬁrst, that the Conservative and La-
bour policies on Academies and Swedish-style Free Schools differ very much
from each other; second, that Labour’s response to the Conservative-led
Coalitions’ Academies Act 2010 (which includes Free Schools) is dismissive,
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not supportive. At the time of writing (2014), it is only possible to analyze
Labour’s response to the Academies and Free Schools over the past 5 years
and in its capacity as an opposition party. In the Swedish case, one had the
advantage point of looking back at about 30 years to see how the Social
Democratic party, both in its role as a governing and opposition party, re-
sponded to the Free Schools there. However, when looking back at the
Labour party’s reaction from the late 1980s to the Conservatives’ City Tech-
nology Colleges and the more extensive grant-maintained schools (school
types upon which the Academies and Free Schools are largely built), we know
that Labour repeatedly expressed stiff opposition to the grant-maintained
schools and pledged their abolition. Particularly “old” Labour politicians
were highly critical of them, and successive party conferences passed res-
olutions that would require a Labour government to return these “opted-out”
schools to the local education authorities (LEAs). When Labour came to
power in 1997, it subjected the grant-maintained schools to greater control
by the LEAs and brought their expansion to a deﬁnitive end (McCulloch
1989; Fitz et al. 1993).
In 2010 the Coalition government introduced the Academies Bill, which
passed into law in July 2010. This provided for the introduction of earlier
mentioned two new school types, the Academies and the Swedish-inspired
Free Schools. In the act there are no clear conceptual differences between
them. But in reality the Academies are already established schools, usually
FIG. 1.—Relative position of Swedish Social Democrats and British Labour Party (Hicks 2011)
WIBORG
488 August 2015
high performing ones, converted to Academy status, whereas Free Schools
are entirely new schools (sometimes called start-up Academies), established
mainly by group of parents who are teachers, charities, religious organiza-
tions, and academy chains. Free Schools have similar governance arrange-
ments to academies but with fewer restrictions in regards to the kind of or-
ganizations that are allowed to manage such a school. The Free School is the
political ﬂagship of the Coalition government and represents the strongest
initiative to privatize education despite the fact that proﬁt making is not al-
lowed. The Education Secretary, Michael Gove, expressed in 2010 no “ideo-
logical objection” to businesses running state schools for proﬁt, but due to
immense opposition, Gove has been unable to allow this.
Scholars frequently draw comparisons between the Academies and Free
Schools and the City Academies introduced by the previous (New Labour)
government, since a strong afﬁnity appears to exist between them—for ex-
ample, school autonomy and the involvement of private business. The New
Labour City Academy (“City” was later dropped) appeared in the Labour
Party’s General Election Manifesto from 2001 and was pursued vigorously
through the party’s second term by a leading advisor to Tony Blair, Andrew
Adonis. The Academies were established in disadvantaged areas and, when
the Coalition government came into power, were expanded into a system-
wide model (Hatcher 2011; Higham 2013).
This narrative of cross-party consensus, I argue, is ill conceived as La-
bour and the Conservatives have fundamentally different scopes for and
rationales behind the Academies. New Labour restricted the Academies to
a limited number of areas (the initial target for Academies was set at 200,
a ﬁgure that was raised to 400 in 2007), whereas the Conservatives regard
the Academy as a model applicable for all schools. Unlike their universal
comprehensive school model of the 1960s, Labour designed Academies,
backed with generous capital investments, to be a radical “fresh start” for
failing schools in areas of high deprivation and historically low achievement
(Chitty 2013). The policy was explicitly developed as a measure to narrow
the attainment gap between schools with advantaged and disadvantaged
intakes. As Curtis shows (2008, table 7), academies have consistently taught
a proportion of students eligible for free school meals that is between two
and three times higher than the national average for nonacademies (29 per-
cent for academies and 12.8 percent for all other schools). In the Con-
servatives’ version of the Academy, which does not come with additional
funding, the focus has moved away from underperforming schools toward
outstanding schools. Schools rated “outstanding” by OFSTED are automati-
cally preapproved for transfer to Academy status under the provision of the
Act. The Conservatives regard the Academy as a universal school model, not
just a model for schools with challenging intakes, poor attainment, and low
aspiration.
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Furthermore, Labour took measures to protect against unfair admis-
sions and, via targeted funding streams, to save unpopular schools, usually
in disadvantaged areas, from being rapidly destabilized. Labour introduced
a code of practice on admission in 1998, strengthened it in 2002, and again
in 2007. The Coalition government introduced a new simpliﬁed and less
prescriptive code and also removed the requirement for local authorities to
have admissions forums or to report regularly to an adjudicator. Moreover,
Labour retained a role for local authorities in managing local markets by
controlling the number of surplus places and having responsibility for de-
cisions about the opening of new schools. The Coalition does not require
local authorities to support the creation of new schools or to reduce surplus
places. Schools can be established in areas already with a surplus of school
places. This is intended to liberate the market to function freely (Goodwin
2011; Hatcher 2011).
In terms of scope, rationale, and admission policies, the Academy pro-
gram of the Conservatives clearly diverges from the original Labour for-
mula, and thus the Coalition’s enactment of it cannot be regarded as a
simple facsimile of New Labour policy. Labour pursued traditional Labour
policies by establishing City Academies in deprived areas, supporting them
with generous capital investment, often in the form of expensive new build-
ings, and restricting their use to the underprivileged. The Conservatives
revamped the Labour Academy model to expand it into a more general
policy in which schools serving the middle classes are enabled to break free
from state control. This constitutes a clear break from Labour policies.
The Free Schools program reveals even more clearly the differences in
policy objectives between Conservatives and Labour. It was the ﬁrst major
education initiative developed by the Conservatives and was announced well
in advance of the general election in 2010. The rationale for the policy was
to deregulate the supply side of education, allowing new suppliers such as
parents, teachers, or private companies to open schools with relaxation of
some of the restrictions on school places, school buildings, and curriculum.
As mentioned, around 85 such schools have opened in mainly afﬂuent mid-
dle class areas. The Conservatives’ commitment to supply side deregulation,
emphasis on demand side provision, and funding for surplus places are a
far cry from Labour policies (Goodwin 2011).
However, the Liberal Democrats serving in the coalition, despite party
convergence of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats between 2006
and 2010, have constituted a Left-leaning check on the policies of the Con-
servatives. The Liberal Democrats, with its strong Social Democratic roots,
have opposed strongly the Conservatives’ Free School policy and pursued
an egalitarian policy through a “pupil premium” scheme that attaches more
funding to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. By doing so, they
appear to have been able to halt a dramatic policy drift to the Right. But the
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Labour party, in opposition, has been even more ferociously opposed to
the new directions taken for the both the Academies and Free Schools
program.
The successive shadow education secretaries, Ed Ball, Stephen Twigg,
and Tristan Hunt have been outspoken critics of the Academies and Free
Schools. They want to bring the Free Schools program to an end, allow
Academies only where they are needed, and rule out proﬁt-making schools.
They argue that this measure should help to put an end to the fragmented,
divisive system (Goodwin 2011). While the Coalition government may ap-
pear to be using a Labour-invented policy tool, in fact their dramatic ex-
pansion of the Academy and Free School program fundamentally changed
it. Whereas Labour was focused on implementing a policy that channeled
resources and expertise to schools in deprived areas, the Conservatives have
pushed academies in favor of the middle classes without additional funding.
On the surface it appears a policy consensus, but as argued here the po-
litical parties divert strongly on the matter.
Comparative Analysis and Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the variation in the extent of outsourcing schools to
private providers in Sweden and England showed that political histories
of the respective countries go far in explaining this variation. Sweden has
a multiparty system with a strong center, fostering consensus policies, and
England, broadly speaking, has a two-party system, which produces much
stronger Left-Right conﬂicts. The Swedish Social Democratic party constituted
a united party against a more disparate right-wing bloc made up of liberals,
conservatives, and agrarians. Coupled with long periods of electoral hege-
mony, the corporatist mode of interest mediation became ﬁrmly part of the
political process, even when the party was occasionally out of government.
Olof Petterson (1994, 34) argues that the aim of political decision making
has been to avoid divisive conﬂicts; an emphasis on compromise and prag-
matic solutions has led to a political consensus culture. Thus, governments,
typically minority ones, tend not to have the ability to force through legisla-
tion without the support of some sections of the opposition. This process has
resulted in broad agreements of education policy over a long period of time.
In striking contrast, England with its by and large two-party system has meant
that power between parties is not shared in ofﬁce (which encourages party
collaboration) but rather consecutively (which increases partisan politics).
Despite the appearance of cross-party consensus, partisanship over educa-
tion policy plays and still continues to play a profound role. This strong con-
trast between the political systems helps explain why Sweden could reach
consensus about the Free Schools, as opposed to England, where strong dis-
agreements about them continue to persist. However, it does not adequately
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explain why the policy of outsourcing schools was pursued in the ﬁrst place.
It is customary in the education literature to argue that right-wing govern-
ments are directly responsible for this, but such a stance ignores the role the
Left has played in this development. For instance, in Sweden it was the Social
Democrats, not a right-wing government, who introduced school choice,
which was necessary for the Free Schools to ﬂourish.
The positioning of the Swedish Social Democrats and the British La-
bour on the Left-Right dimension aided further in the explanation of the
Free School variance. As shown by the Comparative Manifesto Project, in
the period between 1997 and 2006, during which both the Social Democrats
and Labour were in power in their respective countries, the Social Dem-
ocrats were to the Left of Labour, but after 2006 and up to the present, they
were to the Right of Labour. Their location further Right helps to explain
why the Swedish Social Democrats were in a position to endorse the Free
Schools program, originally designed by a right-wing government. The
Swedish Social Democrats were pushed by increasingly powerful right-wing
parties to reform the welfare state/public sector. Since they dominated gov-
ernment and felt strong “ownership” toward “their” welfare state, the per-
ceived problems of its inﬂexibility inevitably became a party issue, to which
they were compelled to respond. Hence, they were put in a situation that
forced them to make a strategic move to the Right. This brought the Social
Democrats closer to the smaller right-wing parties, the Liberals, the Chris-
tian Democrats, and the Centre Party, but not the Conservatives. Except for
the latter, each of these parties is more centrist and during most of the
1990s up to the present, they were indistinguishable from the Social Dem-
ocrats on the CMP’s Left-Right dimension. With policy preferences closer
to the Right, the Social Democrats were therefore more likely to endorse
rather than object to the Free Schools. However, conﬂicts over Free Schools
were certainly not absent, and the Social Democrats indeed tried to re-
solve some of the negative outcomes of the Free Schools. Importantly, they
chose not to bring the program to an end, accepting it as a universal school
model.
From 1992 to 1997 in England, Labour, for the ﬁrst time in its history
moved sharply to the revealing of a predominance of right-wing political
positions over left-wing ones. In strong contrast to its Swedish counterpart,
this did not lead the party to accept the previous Conservative governments’
grant-maintained schools and apply it as a system-wide model. Instead, the
City Academy was created, which indeed bore a “neoliberal” imprint, no-
tably by ensuring autonomy and involving private business, but this school
type was only meant to improve poor educational attainment in a restricted
number of deprived areas. By focusing on disadvantaged neighborhoods,
the Labour party was pursuing traditional left-wing politics. After the La-
bour victory in 1997, the party retreated to its left-wing position, and the
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Academy program was pursued even more vigorously. According to Bara
and Budge (2001), Labour’s move to the Right is much exaggerated in the
debate about British politics. This strongly appears to be the case in the
education policy literature.
In regards to the Coalition’s Academies and Free School act of 2010,
education scholars have frequently suggested that a cross-party consensus
has emerged, since the new Academies resemble those of New Labour’s. As
argued in this article, while the Coalition government appears to be using a
Labour-invented program, the dramatic expansion of the Academies, but
not the Free Schools, constitutes a fundamental change in the program. In
stark contrast to Labour’s intention, the Coalition turned the Academies
and Free Schools into a universal model. Whereas the New Labour Acad-
emies typically involved closing down an existing poorly performing school
and opening a new one in a new building, there is no rationale for doing so
by the Coalition as it encourages schools with outstanding results, not fail-
ing schools, to apply for Academy status. In this sense, this policy is un-
deniably Conservative.
The Labour party, in opposition since 2010, regardless of being some-
what equivocal about what a future Labour government would do to the
Academies and Free Schools program, has indeed expressed a strong crit-
icism of them. However, the question is whether Labour would either ac-
cept these schools and mitigate some of the negative social effects they may
cause, or take more radical steps to close down the Free School program
entirely and return the Academies to the local authorities. This depends on
where Labour is to be found on the CMP’s Left-Right dimension when it
returns to government. The Labour party has ﬂuctuated on that dimension
more than any other British party in the post-war period; but possibly it will,
as in its recent past, move to the Right in the run-up to a national election
and, if winning it, subsequently return to its leftist positions. Only time will
tell. However, as evinced in the Swedish case, the Labour party’s endorse-
ment of and push toward out-sourcing education is crucial if Free Schools
are to expand in England. The Swedish Social Democrats’ position further
to the Right than the Labour party, forging consensus, is the factor nec-
essary and sufﬁcient to explain why the traditional social democratic Sweden
bypassed liberal England in the pursuit of Free Schools.
There is a much needed rethinking of previous analysis of Swedish and
English privatization reforms of education. Suffering from insufﬁcient en-
gagement in comparative analysis, it results in a tendency to overemphasize
particular causes reserved only to one country. Even though policy studies
have provided us important detailed and rich accounts, for example, in
highly descriptive maps of complex networks of policy making in education,
comparative methods help in building more complete policy theories. Com-
parison of countries thus allows rival explanations to be ruled out, and hy-
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potheses derived from theoretical perspectives to be tested through exam-
ining cross-national variances. This article is a small step in this direction. The
theory of Free School policy presented here can be further developed only
through analysis of additional sets of country cases and possible factors.
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